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THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION ON STOLEN OR
ILLEGALLY EXPORTED CULTURAL OBJECTS:
AN ANSWER TO THE WORLD PROBLEM
OF ILLICIT TRADE IN CULTURAL PROPERTY
Claudia Fox*
INTRODUCTION
Recent media reports have brought to the forefront of the public's
attention the worldwide problem of illegal trade' in stolen art.! By
some accounts the problem has grown to critical proportions,3 and is
* J.D. Candidate 1994, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See PAUL BAToR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 10 (1981) (distinguish-
ing between those objects stolen and smuggled out of the country of origin, and
property exported in violation of a foreign state's export laws). For the purposes of
this Comment, "illegal trade" will include both stolen objects and those which are
exported in contravention of a foreign state's export laws.
2. See Suzanne Possehl, Russian Art Objects Vanishing to the West in
Smugglers' Bags, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1993, at C15 (reporting that Russia's chang-
ing borders and economic crisis have led to a significant increase in the number of
Russian art objects being smuggled across the borders); Paul Rambali, Booming
Chronicle of Stolen Art, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 13, 1992, at 14 (reporting that, according
to the European Council, 60,000 works of art are stolen each year in Europe); Nick
Nuttall, Computer Listing Aims to Tighten Net on Art Thieves, TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File. See also Kate Dourian, Art Theft
to be Major Problem when Borders Come Down in 1992, REUTER LIaR. REP., Sept.
16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (stating that thieves will
simply cross the borders with their stolen goods while police will be required to seek
special permission to follow up on a theft).
3. See RALPH E. LERNER & JuDrrm BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COL-
LECTORS, DEALERS AND AR=ISTS 50 (1981) (stating that the International Foundation
for Art Research estimates that billions of dollars worth of stolen and smuggled art is
currently in circulation); Ann Guthrie Hingston, Preserving Mandind's Heritage, U.S.
Efforts to Prevent Illicit Trade in Cultural Property, UNrrED STATES INFOR?.IATION
AGENCY (1991) (stating that as the commercial value of cultural property continues to
increase, so does the illicit trade and art thievery); see also Mark Palmer, Focus on
Art Theft: Antiques Rogue Show Mark Palmer Goes on the Trail of a New Genera-
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linked to the illicit drug trade.4 The high value of art, combined with a
low recovery rate and few arrests, has made illicit trade in art an attrac-
tive business for criminals.' Worldwide, trade in stolen art is estimated
to total between $860 million and $2.6 billion annually.6
Pillaging, theft and destruction of cultural property also continues to
be a problem during war despite international agreements which prohibit
such action.7 During both World Wars, invading soldiers destroyed or
stole many movable art treasures.8 Such was the case of the
tion of Artful Dodgers - The Gangs Who Have Discovered a Fast Road to Serious
Riches With the Easy Pickings of the Creme de la Crime, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Sept.
29, 1991, at 10 (quoting Philip Davies of English Heritage as saying that the interna-
tional crime of stolen art trade is reaching "epidemic" proportions). But see Interview
with Harold Burman, Office of the Legal Adviser, State Department, in Washington,
D.C. (Nov. 2, 1993) (disagreeing with media portrayal of the magnitude of trade in
stolen art).
4. Leah E. Eisen, The Missing Piece: A Discussion of Theft, Statutes of Limi-
tations, and Title Disputes in the World of Art, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067
(1991). See also Milton Esterow, Confessions of an Art Cop, ART NEws, May 1988,
at 134, 137 (noting that an expert on security for art museums claims art thievery is
the second largest international criminal activity); Palmer, supra note 3 (stating that
illegal trade in art is the third largest international crime after trade in drugs and
arms trafficking).
5. See Lyndel V. Prott, International Control of Illicit Movement of the Cul-
tural Heritage: The 1970 UNESCO Convention and Some Possible Alternatives, 10
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 333, 345 (1983) (stating that "the publicity sur-
rounding the volume of the art trade, its soaring prices, the aggressive promotion by
auction houses and the continual emphasis on the record-breaking sums reached, have
done much to promote cultural property as a lucrative field for dishonest activities
and to attract illicitly acquired goods to the auction and sales rooms of the 'art
market' states"). See also Joseph F. Edwards, Major Global Treaties for the Protec-
tion and Enjoyment of Art and Cultural Objects, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 919, 920-21
(1991) (reporting that the art market is inflated); Carol L. Morris, In Search of a
Stolen Masterpiece: The Causes and Remedies of International Art Theft, 15 SYRA-
CUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 59, 73 (1988); Esterow, supra note 4, at 137 (observing
that even when arrests are made, the punishments are too lenient to deter further
thefts).
6. Kate Dourian, Art Theft to be Major Problem when Borders Come Down
in 1992, REUTER LIBR. REP., Sept. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
OMNI File.
7. See infra notes 139-56 and accompanying text (noting that the Hague Con-
vention bans such activity).
8. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on Criminal Jurisdiction in International
Protection of Cultural Property, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 281, 291-92
(1983). See also Stanislaw E. Nahlik, International Law and the Protection of Cultur-
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Quedlinburg treasures,9 a valuable"0 collection of medieval art" stolen
from a German church at the end of World War II." When the trea-
sures resurfaced last year in the possession of an American soldier's
heirs, 3 Germany filed suit in the United States for their recovery."
al Property in Armed Conflicts, 27 HASTINGS LJ. 1069, 1076 (1983) (stating that
during World War I[ the Nazis destroyed whole towns, causing tremendous damage to
cultural heritage); Meredith Van Pelt, Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cy-
prus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.: A Case for the Use of Civil Remedies
in Effecting the Return of Stolen Art, 8 DICKiNSON J. INT'L L. 441, 442 (1990) (not-
ing that owners of movable treasures hid their valuables to avoid destruction by in-
vading soldiers but often the treasures were found and subsequently destroyed or
stolen); Bob Edwards, German Art Stolen by G-Is During IVIYII (National Public
Radio Show's Morning Edition broadcast, Apr. 15, 1992) (reporting that vast quanti-
ties of art objects disappeared from German museums and churches during World
War II, many of which are still missing). Experts believe that much of the art came
to the United States with returning GIs who, during post-victory celebrations, insisted
on collecting "souvenirs." Id.; Glen Collins, New Hopes of Finding Lost and Looted
Art, N.Y. TIMEs, June 20, 1991, at 11 (reporting that a compilation of missing art
work at the end of the Nazi years included 4,000 paintings and adding that Allied
soldiers stole some of the work).
9. See William H. Honan, It's Finally Agreed: Germany to Regain A Stolen
Trove, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1992, at 15 (reporting that during World War I, the
German Government hid the treasures in a mineshaft near Quedlinburg, Germany for
safekeeping).
10. See id. (reporting that the attorney instrumental in negotiating the return of
the treasures described them as "one of the most important collections of religious art
of the early Middle Ages"); see also Marcia Chambers, One Theft That Brought Big
Rewards; German Art Theft Becomes a U.S. Civil Matter, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25, 1991,
at 13 (stating that in 1980, the treasure was valued at approximately $240 million).
11. See Stiftskirche-Domgemeinde of Quedlinburg v. Meador, No.
CA3-90-1440-D (N.D. Texas, filed June 18, 1990) [hereinafter Complaint] (stating that
the fourteen items, which include a comb and a reliquary covered with precious
stones, are believed to have belonged to Henry 1); see also Stolen Treasures Return-
ing to German Church; Art: The Heirs of a Soldier IVho Found the Priceless Objects
and Sent them to Texas at the End of WWII Receive a Total of $2.75 Million, L.A.
TiEs, Jan. 8, 1991, at 10 (quoting Dietrich Kovtzche, an expert in German art who
called the objects "among the three most significant medieval church treasures in
Germany"). See generally Honan, supra note 9 (reporting that a study by Charles T.
Little, curator at the Metorpolitan Museum of Art, stressed the importance of the
missing collection).
12. See Peter Gillman, The Gospel Story, INDFPENDEN, Mar. 30, 1991, at 20-
28 (describing the story of an American soldier who discovered the Quedlinburg trea-
sures). See also Chambers, supra note 10, at 13 (noting that Germany's discovery of
the treasure involved a series of unusual circumstances).
13. See Chambers, supra note 10, at 3 (stating that a Vest German foundation
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Despite the fact that American property law favors the original owner,"
Germany settled out of court, paying the heirs close to $3 million for
the entire collection. 6 The art world has expressed profound dissatisfac-
tion with the settlement, warning that it sets a dangerous precedent. 7
established to recover stolen art discovered the whereabouts of the treasures); Gillman,
supra note 12 (reporting the events leading to Germany's discovery of the treasures).
14. See Complaint, supra note 11 (stating that on June 18, 1990, the
Quedlinburg Church filed suit against the heirs of the thief, and against the First
National Bank of Whitewright, Texas for the recovery of the "Quedlinburg Trea-
sures"). The complaint also requested declaratory and injunctive relief and damages.
Id
15. See Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the Republic of
Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1376 (1989) (finding
for the plaintiff, whose property had been stolen and sold to a bona fide purchaser)
[hereinafter Autocephalous]; Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (not-
ing that the burden of proving that the painting was not stolen is on the possessor,
not the original owner) [hereinafter Guggenheim]; Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v.
Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982)
(requiring that the possessor deliver the paintings to the original owner). But see
DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd, 836 F.2d 103 (2d
Cir. 1987) (finding that the owner had not used due diligence in investigating missing
art). See generally infra notes 68-138 and accompanying text (noting that the general
application of common law rules and equitable principles in replevin cases supports
the original owner's property rights).
16. See Compromise Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release, section 4.06,
signed by the heirs of the alleged thief on Feb. 25, 1992, and by the German gov-
ernment on Mar. 2, 1992 [hereinafter Compromise Settlement] (stating that the
$912,500 settlement amount was stipulated in the settlement as monies to reimburse
the heirs "for their costs and expenses, and to avoid the delay, expense and uncer-
tainty of further litigation"). See also Chambers, supra note 10, at 13 (observing that
the Foundation discovered the artwork when the heirs sold one of the missing pieces,
a manuscript, to the Foundation for $1.75 million. When the heirs tried to sell an-
other piece to the Foundation, Germany became fearful that the heirs would attempt
to sell the collection piecemeal, and filed suit in a district court in Texas to recover
the entire collection); Honan, supra note 19, at 15 (noting that Germany also sent
letters to American authorities, stating that Germany would not seek criminal prosecu-
tion but these letters were not included in the settlement because the heirs did not
want to violate the law or be understood as bringing pressure to silence witnesses)
(on file with The American University Journal of International Law and Policy).
17. See William H. Honan, With Stolen Treasures, Generosity Has Its Price,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1992, at 6 (quoting Constance Lowenthal, Executive Director of
the International Foundation for Art Research, as equating the settlement to "paying
ransom for your baby"). See also William H. Honan, Deal on Stolen German Art
Meets With Mixed Reaction, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1991, at C13 (quoting Robert T.
Buck, director of the Brooklyn Museum, who called the settlement "blackmail"). Buck
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Others, however, insist that the agreement represents a practical solution
for the restitution of stolen property."8 While in principle it may seem
unjust for the rightful owners of stolen property to pay for its return,
the Quedlinburg settlement may be better understood when viewed in
the framework of the law that governs stolen artwork cases. 9
International efforts to curb the illicit trade in art have been largely
unsuccessful Competing national policies of art-importing and
art-exporting countries have weakened attempts to gain world support for
international agreements governing stolen property cases!' Furthermore,
rules of common law nations, such as the United States, which protect
the rights of the original owner, conflict with the civil law of other na-
argues that the settlement sends the message that "theft pays" and sets bad precedent.
Id See also Kuwait Asks UNESCO Help To Prevent Sale of Stolen Art Objects,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESsE, June 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURRNT File (noting that Kuwait has asked for help from UNESCO to prevent sales
of artifacts stolen during the Gulf War); Gillman, supra note 12, at 26 (reporting that
John Colin, an expert in medieval art who looked at the Quedlinburg treasures in
1986, told the heirs that the treasures were obviously stolen and should be returned).
When the suit between Germany and the heirs became public, Collins was "outraged."
Id. at 28.
18. See Honan, supra note 9, at 15 (reporting that Germany settled out of
court to avoid an uncertain outcome at trial); Chambers, supra note 10, at 13 (report-
ing that the German government settled because of concern over lengthy and costly
litigation).
19. See infra notes 68-138 and accompanying text (noting that there are prob-
lems with the application of equitable principles, judicial inconsistencies, and the
ineffectiveness of statutes and common law remedies). See generally Karen S. Jore,
The Illicit Movement of Art and Artifact: How Long Will the Market Continue to
Benefit From Ineffective Laws Governing Cultural Property?, 13 BROOK. L REv. 55.
61 (1987) (discussing the reasons that theft of cultural property is not successfully
regulated); Judith Church, Note, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Foreign Laws on
National Ownership of Cultural Property in U.S. Courts, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL
L. 179 (1992).
20. See George W. Nowell, American Tools to Control the Illegal Movement of
Foreign Origin Archaeological Materials: Criminal and Civil Approaches, 6 SYRACuSE
J. INT'L L. & CoM. 77, 80 (1978) (stating that international efforts have failed to
control the movement of illicit materials). See also LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 3,
at 299-300 (stating that legal remedies available to the United States and foreign
nations are cumbersome and inadequate due to problems of proving title, statutes of
limitations, and treaty limitations); infra notes 139-213 and accompanying text (noting
that international agreements governing stolen property are ineffective).
21. See infra notes 193-213 and accompanying text (noting that the national
interests of art-importing nations and art-exporting nations are at odds and prevent
formulation of an internationally acceptable agreement governing stolen property).
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tions which favor the rights of the bona fide purchaser.' In an effort to
strike a balance between these competing interests, the courts have creat-
ed inconsistencies in the body of law governing stolen cultural proper-
ty.
23
The competing policies and inconsistent standards governing stolen
property cases have created roadblocks to international cooperation. 24
Some scholars, therefore, have advocated uniform standards which would
provide for more equitable application of existing law,' and which
would be accepted by a large number of both civil and common law na-
tions.'
In response to problems of the illicit trade in art and antiquities, the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT or
the Convention) is in the process of drafting a model convention.
UNIDROIT's Preliminary Draft Convention on Stolen or Illegally Ex-
ported Cultural Objects'3 is an attempt to reconcile differences within
the national policies and domestic law of various nations.' By creating
22. See infra notes 207, 213 and accompanying text (explaining that civil law
countries protect bona fide purchasers).
23. See infra notes 90-138 and accompanying text (noting that various jurisdic-
tions interpret the due diligence requirement differently, leaving purchasers and the
original owners of stolen artwork unsure of the standards to use when investigating
the provenance of a work of art).
24. See infra note 193-213 and accompanying text (discussing the competing
interests among nations which have prevented international cooperation in the regu-
lation of stolen art).
25. See Maritza F. Bolano, Note, International Art Theft Disputes: Harmonizing
Common Law Principles with Article 7(b) of the UNESCO Convention, 15 FORDHAM
INT'L LJ. 129, 156-57 (1991) (calling for the United States to develop a uniform
standard of adjudicating complex cultural property disputes in order to effectuate the
UNESCO Convention's goals of deterring the illegal art trade and aiding signatory na-
tions in the recovery of stolen or illegally exported property).
26. See Explanatory Report of the Draft UNIDROIT Convention prepared by
the UNIDROIT Secretariat Study LXX - Doc. 19, 10, Aug. 1990 [hereinafter Explana-
tory Report] (explaining the compromises made by the study group to attract greater
acceptance by the international community).
27. Preliminary Draft UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects, Study LXX - Doc. 40, 1990 (original in French) [hereinafter 1990
Draft Convention]; Preliminary Draft UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects, Study LXX - Doc. 40, 1993 (original in English) [here-
inafter 1993 Draft Convention].
28. See infra notes 214-74 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of
the UNIDROIT Convention that attempt to provide a workable set of rules acceptable
to countries whose laws offer greater protection to bona fide purchasers and to those
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a workable set of uniform rules and private litigation rights, the drafters
of the UNIDROIT Convention seek to harmonize antithetical aspects of
common law and civil law jurisprudence on the issue in order to attract
a large number of signatory nations.' The UNIDROIT Convention is
broader in scope a than existing agreements and takes much-needed
steps toward balancing the interests of original owners and bona fide
purchasers?' Among other provisions the Convention establishes a right
of return of stolen objects, thereby protecting the property rights of the
original owner.' At the same time, it provides for an equitable remedy
of compensation to be paid to good faith purchasers who have taken
appropriate steps to ensure that the art has good title."
This Comment analyzes the global need for a uniform standard in
view of existing problems of international law and to determine whether
the UNIDROIT Convention successfully addresses those problems. Part I
highlights the application of United States domestic law to cases of
stolen international cultural property. This section focuses on the Nation-
al Stolen Property Act and the civil action in replevin and examines the
inadequacies preventing effective remedies. Part II examines the princi-
pal international agreements for the protection of stolen international
property, the UNESCO Convention and the Hague Convention of 1954,
and examines their limitations. Part RI discusses the policy consider-
ations and competing values of nations that have thus far prevented the
adoption of an international agreement acceptable to a large number of
nations. Part IV discusses the UNIDROIT Preliminary Draft Convention
on Stolen or ilegally Exported Cultural Objects and its compatibility
whose laws favor the original owner).
29. Memorandum from Harold S. Burman, Office of the Legal Adviser. State
Department, to Advisory Committee Members and Commentators on the Proposed
UNIDRO1T Convention of the International Protection of Cultural Property (Dec. 5,
1991) [hereinafter Burman Memorandum] (on file with The American University Jour-
nal of International Law and Policy).
30. See infra notes 214-25 and accompanying text (explaining that, unlike pre-
vious international agreements, the UNIDROIT Convention expands litigation rights of
governments and provides for restitution of the stolen object to the original owner).
31. See infra notes 226-74 and accompanying text (discussing articles 3 and 4
of the UNIDROIT Convention which seek to provide an equitable solution to good
faith purchasers while preserving the property rights of the original owners).
32. See 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27. art.
3.
33. See 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art.
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with United States common law. Part IV argues that the United States
should lead the way in adopting the UNIDROIT Convention because it
offers an equitable solution to art theft cases.
The UNIDRO1T Convention, if ratified, would protect the rights of
both the original owners and bona fide purchasers of art. Moreover, it
would significantly deter illicit art trade without damaging free trade in
art, and it is compatible with United States law and existing internation-
al agreements.
I. UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW CONCERNING
STOLEN CULTURAL PROPERTY
A. THE NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT
The National Stolen Property Act (NSPA)4 makes it a federal crime
to transport goods35 in foreign commerce which are known to be sto-
len.36 Because the NSPA is a criminal statute, however, it does not
provide for the restitution of a stolen artifact." Also, since the NSPA is
a criminal statute," courts tend to interpret it strictly, requiring all ele-
ments of the crime to be proven.39 Under the NSPA, this involves a
34. National Stolen Property Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2318 (1976) [hereinafter
NSPA].
35. See BATOR, supra note 1, at 10 (differentiating between stolen and illegally
exported cultural property). Exportation of an object from a foreign country contrary
to that country's law is not actionable in the United States unless the object is stolen.
Id. An object may be illegally exported from a foreign country and lawfully imported
into the United States. Id.; see also Nowell, supra note 20, at 87 (stating that the
NSPA does not reach cultural property illegally exported but not stolen).
36. See 18 U.S.C § 2314 (providing that "[w]hoever transports, transmits, or
transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities
or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to be stolen, converted
or taken by fraud . . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not-
more than ten years, or both").
37. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 3, at 302.
38. See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 994 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating
that Congess' intent in enacting stolen property statutes was to aid the states by dis-
couraging local and interstate traffic in stolen goods); see also Nowell, supra note 20,
at 89 (using legislative history to show that the NSPA was not enacted to cover
foreign archaeological theft).
39. See McClain, 545 F.2d at 995 (providing authority which holds that United
States jurisprudence interprets penal laws strictly in order to protect individuals'
rights).
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required showing of "scienter": the defendant's state of mind indicating
that he had knowledge that the goods were stolen.m ' Proving scienter in
stolen art cases is normally more difficult than for other commercial
goods. 1 This difficulty is a function of the nature of the art transaction
itself. Often, the exchange of art objects is made through art dealers and
auction houses who take very few measures to verify the provenance of
the artwork. This lack of procedural safeguards makes it difficult to
show a legitimate chain of title."2 Thus, more often than not, stolen
artwork resurfaces on the legitimate market with the purchaser unaware
of its illicit background.43
Until the early 1970s, because of the difficulty in proving the scienter
element, the prosecution of possessors of stolen art was only a theoreti-
cal deterrent to art theft." In 1974, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Hollinshead upheld a criminal conviction
under the NSPA. The Hollinshead defendants had stolen and imported
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (requiring knowledge that the article was "stolen,
unlawfully converted or taken"); see generally McLain, 545 F.2d at 1002 (noting that
because defendants did not have knowledge that the articles were technically consid-
ered "stolen" under Mexican law, they could not be liable under the NSPA); Nowell,
supra note 20, at 88-91 (discussing the statutory interpretation problems with the
NSPA).
41. See NoweU, supra note 20, at 98 n.106 (remarking that fenes destroy evi-
dence of theft by selling to unsuspecting buyers who in turn serve to convert and
legitimize the stolen item). See also Van Pelt, supra note 8, at 448 (stating that the
majority of stolen art work resurfaces in the legal art market only after it has been
purchased several times, creating an apparently legitimate chain of itle); Prott. supra
note 5, at 348 (stating that the world's largest auction houses are not subject to con-
trol, allowing illegally acquired goods to be marketed).
42. See Prott, supra note 5, at 345 (stating that many dealers and art experts
do not take steps to determine the origins of artwork). See also LERNEM & BRESLER,
supra note 3, at 49 (observing that because it is unique and irreplaceable, art is often
purchased on a whim by an uninformed buyer); Jore, supra note 19, at 76 (discussing
that there are no requirements that auction houses determine prior ownership of art).
43. See Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar, 536 F. Supp. at 833 (explaining that the
defendant purchased the object from an American ex-serviceman without knowing it
was stolen); see also DeWeerth, 835 F.2d at 103 (explaining that defendant purchased
the missing paintings for value and in good faith from an art gallery that had ac-
quired the painting on consignment from a Swiss art dealer); Nowell, supra note 20,
at 95 (calling for a legal tool to address stolen art objects with minimal or no scien-
ter requirement).
44. See BATOR, supra note 1, at 68-69 (noting that difficulties in proving that
an object was stolen hindered the prosecution of art thieves).
45. 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
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to the United States rare pre-Columbian artifacts from Guatemala. The
circuit court held that even if the defendants did not know Guatemalan
law as they claimed, they were aware that the objects were technically
stolen.' The court further stated that once a nation declares ownership
of cultural property, the subsequent unapproved taking of that property
is sufficient to render it "stolen" under the NSPA4
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals followed broad interpretation of
the NSPA three years later in United States v. McLain." In McLain,
the court upheld an NSPA conviction for conspiring to receive and
transport unregistered pre-Columbian artifacts through interstate com-
merce.49 The Fifth Circuit, like the Hollinshead court, held that under
the NSPA, where a nation's law clearly declares national ownership of
art objects, an item illegally exported in contravention of such a law
would be considered stolen.' This decision has eroded the critical dis-
tinction between "stolen" and "illegally exported,"'" a distinction usually
46. See Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1156 (upholding NSPA conviction of
co-conspirators who removed pre-Columbian art in contravention of Guatemalan law).
47. Id. The Hollinshead court upheld the conviction of a dealer in
pre-Columbian art for stealing and conspiring to transport a rare Guatemalan stela
worth thousands of dollars. Id. at 1155. The defendants had cut the stela into pieces
for shipment to the United States where they attempted to sell it. Id. The defendants
argued that they did not know that under Guatemalan law the artifacts were classified
as stolen property. Id. The court, however, held that the government only needed to
prove that the defendants knew the article was stolen, not from where it was stolen,
or the specific laws of the country of origin. Id. at 1156 (emphasis added).
48. 545 F.2d 988, reh'g denied, 551 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1977). The case was
remanded to determine whether the Mexican law in effect at the time the article was
exported clearly declare national ownership of the article. See United States v.
MeLain, 593 F.2d 658, 671 (1979) (concluding that "the National Stolen Property
Act . . . cannot properly be applied to items deemed stolen only on the basis of
unclear pronouncements by a foreign legislature").
49. See id. at 995 (rejecting appellants' argument that the NSPA does not
apply to artifacts exported in contravention of Mexican law).
50. Id. at 1000. The lower court convicted the defendants under the NSPA and
instructed the jury that the Mexican law declaring state ownership of all
pre-Columbian artifacts in its jurisdiction had been in place since 1897. Id. at 991.
The circuit court reversed the decision, finding that the Mexican law was not enacted
until 1972. Id. The court, however, upheld the lower court's broad interpretation that
a declaration of national ownership is sufficient to create ownership in a state. Id. at
1000. But see Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that Peru
had not met its burden of establishing ownership at the time the item was exported.)
51. See BATOR, supra note 1, at 74-75 (explaining that exportation of cultural
property from a foreign country in contravention of that country's laws is not per se
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made in international agreements.'-
The McLain decision contradicts U.S. policy which strongly opposes
agreements that allow a country to prosecute according to blanket leg-
islation vesting title of cultural property in that government.? McLain
recognizes a nation's right to claim ownership of all cultural objects
within its jurisdiction, making exportation without permission illegal.'
This recognition leaves open questions about the fate of collections in
American museums55 and the liability of bona fide purchasers who ac-
quire art without knowledge of its origins.'
Commentators have criticized the NSPA as an inadequate response to
art theft on several grounds. First, the scienter element is so difficult to
prove that it is ineffective as a deterrent to art theft." Second, strict ap-
plication of the NSPA in prosecuting all cases in which a foreign gov-
ernment claims blanket ownership of all cultural property in its jurisdic-
tion would create chaos in determining title.' Finally, the NSPA focus-
actionable in the United States).
52. See McLain, 545 F.2d at 996 (discussing the draft provisions of the
UNESCO Convention which called for signatories to criminalize under their laws the
importation of cultural property that was exported without certification from the coun-
try of origin); see also infra notes 157-88 and accompanying text (discussing the
UNESCO Convention provisions regulating illegal export of cultural property).
53. See McLain, 545 F.2d at 996 (discussing the United States' opposition to
provisions that call for blanket legislation covering illegally imported artwork and the
substituted provisions which would include import controls only in crisis situations);
see also Nowell, supra note 20, at 95-96 (stating that the interpretation of the
McLain court conflicts with current approaches to archaeological thefts and may con-
flict with future approaches in negotiating an international solution to the problem of
stolen property); Proceedings of the Panel on the U.S. Enabling Legislation of the
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 4 SYRACUSE I. INr'L L. &
CoM. 97 (1976) (stating that the United States was "not prepared to give the rest of
the world a blank check in that [the United States] would not automatically enforce
through import controls, whatever export controls were established by the other coun-
try except as narrowly limited by Article 9 which calls for controls during a time of
crisis").
54. McLain, 545 F.2d at 988.
55. BATOR, supra note 1, at 76.
56. BATOR, supra note 1, at 77.
57. William D. Rogers, The Legal Response to the Illicit Movement of Cultural
Property, 5 LAw & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 932, 940 (1973) (asserting that the effec-
tiveness of penal laws has been all but erased by the scienter requirement).
58. Nowell, supra note 20, at 108. See BATOR, supra note 1, at 78 (stating
that criminal prosecution should be reserved only for the most "egregious" stolen art
1993]
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
es on criminal conduct59 and does not provide for the restoration of
stolen art to its proper owner, which is a major shortcoming. Because
victims usually seek recovery given the unique characteristics of art and
its irreplacability, the focus on criminal conduct is misplaced.' For
these reasons, many advocate the practicality of civil remedies.'
B. CIVIL AcTION OF REPLEVIN
Victims of art theft usually seek to recover the missing object by
bringing an action in replevin, which provides for the recovery of the
property and incidental- money damages.' Advocates of civil remedies
argue that such actions are a more efficient mechanism for dealing with
stolen art cases, and provide a better deterrent to potential thieves than
does the NSPA.' They argue that civil remedies can be more broadly
applied without the constitutional concerns of criminal prosecution and
the need to prove scienter.' Civil remedies, however, may also have a
disadvantage in that the nature of stolen art transactions makes determi-
nation of title difficult.' Title disputes involve complex issues6 calling
cases).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
60. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1389.
61. See Van Pelt, supra note 8, at 443 (stating that civil remedies are more
efficient than criminal prosecutions for four reasons: first, owners are more apt to sue,
deterring theft by the cost of litigation; second, civil sanctions can be more broadly
applied; third, constitutional protections of the defendant are not a concern; fourth, the
legislative history would not be scrutinized as it often is when a criminal statute is
involved).
62. See Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1395 (defining replevin as a statutory
remedy that allows an owner to recover property wrongfully taken as well as damag-
es incidental to-its detention); see also BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1299 (6th ed.
1990) (defining replevin as an "action whereby the owner or person entitled to repos-
session of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has
wrongfully distrained or taken or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels").
63. See Nowell, supra note 20, at 103 (arguing that civil suits are preferable
to criminal actions for several reasons: civil sanctions encourage wronged owners to
sue, deterring potential thieves with the threat of litigation; the broad application of
civil sanctions reaches individuals not reached by criminal sanctions; the plaintiff is
favored because a defendant is not allowed the constitutional protections mandated in
criminal prosecution).
64. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text (considering the difficulty of
satisfying the NSPA's scienter requirement and the concern over constitutional rights).
65. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of
proving title in art dispute cases).
66. See infra notes 68-138 and accompanying text (examining the difficulties of
236 [VOL. 9:1
1993] UNIDROIT CONVENTION 237
for a balance of common law rules and equitable principles. The result
has been inconsistent court decisions and a lack of unified standards.
1. Statute of Limitations
In an action for replevin in which the owner seeks to recover person-
al property, the general rule is that a thief cannot pass good title to a
purchaser.' One who purchases stolen art, however, may use a statute
of limitations defense against the original owner., The statute of limita-
tions serves to prevent stale claims and to ensure a good faith purchaser
eventual security in the right to title?0 Normally, the statute of limita-
tions begins to run at the time a thief steals the property!' Strict appli-
cation of the statute of limitations, however, would allow a thief or even
a dishonest purchaser of art with dubious provenance to simply conceal
it until the statute of limitations has expired.' On the other hand, good
faith purchasers must 'have security of title or the art market would be
devastated.' The courts, therefore, have applied several other doctrines
reconciling title disputes).
67. See infra notes 90-138 and accompanying text (examining the application
of the discovery rule and requirements of due diligence which have been applied
inconsistently in art theft cases).
68. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1398; Kunstsammhungen Zu Weimar, 536 F.
Supp. at 833; O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 867 (NJ. 1980). See Charles D.
Webb, Jr., Whose Art is it Anyway? Title Disputes and Resolutions in Art Theft Cas-
es, 79 KY. LJ. 883, 885 (1991) (discussing Uniform Commercial Code provisions
allowing thieves to transfer only void title).
69. U.C.C. § 2-403 (1989). Kunstsammlungen, 536 F. Supp. at 846; DeWeerth,
836 F.2d at 103. See Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1385 (stating that courts favor
statutes of limitations because they are firmly based upon public policy consider-
ations).
70. See DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109 (stating that the purpose of the statute of
limitations is to provide a purchaser with security that he or she will not have to
defend unreasonably old claims in which the evidence may have been lost or witness-
es may have disappeared); see also O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 868 (stating that the pur-
pose of a statute of limitations is to "stimulate to activity and punish negligence" in
pursuing claims, and to "promote repose by giving security and stability to human af-
fairs" (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879)).
71. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 106.
72. Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar, 536 F. Supp. at 849. See O'Keeffe, 416
A.2d at 872-73 (discussing the general rule that a thief who fraudulently conceals a
stolen oAject will be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense).
73. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 3, at 82 (asserting that a purchaser's
feeling of security promotes free trade of art).
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in an attempt to mitigate the harshness of the statute of limitations.74
2. Demand and Refusal
Courts in the State of New York follow the "demand and refusal"
rule which holds that the statute of limitations does not begin to run
against a good faith purchaser until the original owner demands return
of the property and the purchaser refuses to comply.' A purchaser of
stolen art is not considered to be in wrongful possession until he or she
refuses a demand for return. 6 The claimant's demand is considered a
substantive condition for bringing the action.' The claimant, however,
must make the demand without unreasonable delay. The claimant, then,
is obligated to use due diligence in searching for stolen property."
3. Adverse Possession
Prior to the New Jersey Supreme Court's pivotal decision in O'Keeffe
v. Snyder,79 an art purchaser/defendant could use the doctrine of ad-
verse possession to establish title by "hostile, actual, visible and exclu-
sive and continuous possession."' At least one commentator argues that
adverse possession affords better protection to the original owner be-
cause it puts a greater burden on subsequent possessors.8 Whether pos-
74. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 869. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1075-81 (describing
the discovery rule as one of the equitable doctrines used to mitigate the strict applica-
tion of the statute of limitations).
75. Menzel v. List, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44 (1964); Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar,
536 F. Supp. at 848-49.
76. Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar, 536 F. Supp. at 848. See Guggenheim, 569
N.E.2d at 426 (commenting that a replevin action against a good faith purchaser does
not accrue until the claimant demands the return of the property and the possessor
refuses). The court stated that and the need to preserve the rights of original owners,
and discourage illicit traffic was particularly important in New York, an important
cultural center. Id.
77. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 426.
78. See DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 107 (finding that the owner had not taken
sufficient measures to locate the missing artwork); Linda F. Pinkerton, Due Diligence
in Fine Art Transactions, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 179 (1990) (analyzing the
due diligence requirements in fine art requirements); see also notes 90-138 and ac-
companying text (demonstrating inconsistent judicial application of the due diligence
standard).
79. 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
80. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 870 (citing Redmond v. New Jersey Historical
Soc'y, 28 A.2d 189 (N.J. 1942).
81. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1077 (stating that the doctrine of adverse pos-
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session is in fact "open and notorious,"' however, is difficult to deter-
mine.
Adverse possession is particularly difficult to define as it relates to
arty Admirers often purchase art for private, personal enjoyment."
The adverse possession doctrine has the effect of forcing owners to
display their art in public exhibits in order to satisfy the "open and
notorious" requirement.' In O'Keeffe,' the New Jersey Supreme Court
found the doctrine of adverse possession inappropriate because it placed
too heavy a burden on art purchasers and did not give them freedom to
use their property according to their desires.' The court found that
there was no satisfactory means by which the purchaser could have
determined the object's provenance." It concluded that the discovery
rule is the more appropriate rule in art theft cases.
4. The Discovery Rule and Due Diligence
The New Jersey Supreme Court's shift to the discovery rule in
O'Keeffe' reversed the trend toward the adverse possession doctrine by
shifting the focus to the conduct of the plaintiff?' Under this rule, fol-
session places a heavier burden on the possessor).
82. See id. (commenting that courts originally applied adverse possession only
to tifle disputes involving land but later applied it to chattels as well). It is difficult
to prove adverse possession of movable property, however, because such property can
be easily concealed. Id
83. Id at 1078.
84. O'Keeffe, 405 A.2d at 871.
85. Id
86. I at 862.
87. See id. at 871-72 (discussing the difficulty of showing adverse possession
by the art owner who displays the art in the privacy of his or her own home). The
stolen paintifigs had been displayed privately, in the home of the possessor and had
been exhibited publicly. See also Eisen, supra note 4, at 1078 (discussing the conflict
between application of the adverse possession doctrine, which requires the purchaser
to display the art publicly, and non-application of the doctrine which gives the theft
victim the impossible task of finding art displayed privately).
88. See O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872 (suggesting that an efficient registry of
artwork might assist good faith purchasers and owners in determining the provenance
of a painting).
89. IMt See also Eisen, supra note 4, at 1078 (suggesting that the OKeeffe
court did not want to set the standard for adverse possession as "open and notorious"
possession and therefore shifted to the discovery rule).
90. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 862.
91. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1078-81 (explaining that many courts have fol-
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lowed in the majority of jurisdictions,' the statute of limitations will
not begin to run until the owner knows or should have known the loca-
tion of the missing artwork." Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
show he or she used due diligence in locating the stolen property.'
The exercise of due diligence becomes a question of fact, and must be
examined on a case-by-case basis.'s
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals examined due diligence in
Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon,' a case involving paintings
stolen from a German museum by an American soldier during World
War II' The court scrutinized the museum's efforts98 to find the
paintings as well as the alleged deficiencies" in its search, and found
that the museum had exercised due diligence."w The District Court for
the Southern District of New York addressed the issue five years later
lowed the O'Keeffe reasoning and no longer apply the adverse possession doctrine).
92. See Acquiring Title to Stolen Art, TEXAS BAR J., Mar. 1992 (stating that
in the majority of jurisdictions, the demand and refusal rule is unnecessary); see also
Eisen, supra note 4, at 1081, 1084 (noting the expanding use of the discovery rule).
93. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 103; Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1374. See also
O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872 (reasoning that the rule permits an owner to retain his or
her right to possession and title as long as the claimant uses reasonable efforts to re-
cover the missing artwork).
94. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872.
95. See id at 873 (stating that the courts should weigh the equitable concerns
of the parties and that the meaning of due diligence will vary in each case). See
infra notes 96-138 and accompanying text (comparing the factors courts have used to
determine due diligence).
96. Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar, 678 F. Supp. at 829.
97. See id. at 837 (finding that, as a matter of law, the paintings were stolen
from the castle where they were placed for safekeeping, and noting that their disap-
pearance coincided with the American troops' departure).
98. See id. at 850 (explaining that the museum's efforts to locate the missing
paintings included correspondence to the Land Office of Education, United States
military authority, the Soviet military authority, Harvard University, and the United
States Department of State).
99. See id. (rejecting the defendant's argument that because the museum had
failed to consult the Central Collection Points established to catalogue and store
artwork until the end of the war, the museum's search did not meet the due diligence
requirement). The court held that in light of the other efforts made to locate the
artwork, the museum's failure to notify the CCP did not constitute lack of diligence.
Id. at 852.
100. Id. at 849-50. The court further held that any delay in bringing the suit
was reasonable given the Cold War tensions existing between the United States and
Germany at the time. Id. at 852.
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in DeWeerth v. Baldinger."' The German owner of a Monet painting
which disappeared at the end of World War II, sued an American who
had purchased the painting in 1957 in New York." The district court
found for the owner, stating that she satisfied the due diligence require-
ment with her recovery efforts."x The appeals court reversed, however,
finding the owner's efforts to have been minimal." The appeals court
focused on what the owner failed to do and listed several steps she
should have taken to locate her painting." Given her wealth and so-
phistication as an art collector, the court concluded, the owner could
have hired someone to carry out the search."
In contrast, the New York Court of Appeals in Guggenheim Foumda-
tion v. Lubell,' emphasized New York's adherence to the demand and
101. 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987).
102. See id. at 104 (explaining that during World War II, the owner sent the
painting to her sister's castle for safekeeping). Americans were quartered in the castle
at the end of the war, and the Monet was missing following the soldiers' departure.
Id. at 105. The owner filed a report with the military government listing the painting
as missing and requested her lawyer's assistance in locating it. ld.
103. 658 F. Supp. at 694 (ruling that sufficient efforts had been made because:
she had reported the loss of the painting to the military government, she had solicited
assistance of her lawyer, she made inquiries to art experts, and she reported the
Monet as missing to the Bundeskriminalant-the West German national investigation
agency). The court excused her cessation of the search from 1957 to 1981, when she
finally located the painting, because of her advanced age. Id. at 694-95. The court
distinguished DeWeerth's search and the due diligence required in Kunstsammlmngen
Zu Weimar, stating that a government-owned museum had more resources available to
pursue a search. Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar, 678 F. Supp. at 829.
104. See 836 F.2d at 111 (holding that writing letters and notifying the military
police was a standard procedure and that the letter written to her lawyer requesting
assistance may have been simply an insurance matter, given the fact that DeWeerth
never pursued the matter).
105. See id. at 111-12 (finding that the owner (I) failed to make use of the
Central Collecting Points established by the Allied forces at the end of the war;, (2)
failed to publicize the theft in available listings made to notify museums; (3) failed to
continue her search between 1957 and 1981; and (4) failed to consult the Catalogue
Raissone, a definitive accounting of an artist's works which showed that the painting
had been exhibited in 1970). Furthermore, the court did not excuse her failure to
search for the missing Monet after 1957, indicating that age was not an important
factor since she was 63 years old when she last attempted to find the painting. Id. at
112.
106. Id.
107. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
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refusal rule,'" and refused to consider due diligence.'" The court rea-
soned that an original owner's failure to meet the due diligence burden
would foreclose that owner's right to recover property, and would en-
courage the illicit sales of stolen art. ' The court held, therefore, that
the burden of investigating provenance of artwork is more properly
placed on the potential purchaser."'
The Indiana case of Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus
v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts"2 incorporates some of New York's
Guggenheim principles. Autocephalous expands the due diligence rule to
include an obligation on the part of the purchaser to exercise due dili-
gence in investigating the provenance of artwork prior to purchase."3
Thus, the Autocephalous decision sets the standard for efforts required
of both plaintiffs and defendants.""
In Autocephalous, Goldberg, an art dealer, bought ancient mosaics
which had been stolen from a church in Cyprus."' The country of Cy-
108. See id. at 430 (noting that the New York legislature rejected the discovery
rule because it did not adequately protect original owners). The court quoted from a
message given by the Governor of New York when he vetoed a bill which would
have modified the demand and refusal rule. Id. The Governor stated that the bill
would make New York "a haven for cultural property stolen abroad since objects
[would] be immune from recovery under the limited time periods established by the
bill." Id.
109. Id. The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation sought to recover a Chagall
gouache which was missing from its museum, believed to have been stolen in the
late 1960s by a mailroom employee. Id. The museum did not realize the painting was
missing until it did a complete inventory in 1969-1970. Id. at 428. The Lubells had
purchased the painting from a gallery, displayed it in their home, and exhibited the
painting twice. Id. at 427-28. The Lubells claimed that the museum had not used due
diligence in searching for the Gouache and that the statute of limitations had therefore
expired. Id. The museum asserted that it purposefully declined to notify authorities
and openly investigate the missing gouache for fear that the publicity would drive the
painting further underground. Id. at 428. The court did not find it necessary to settle
the due diligence issue, stating that it was unfair to place such a heavy burden on
the purchaser of stolen property. Id. at 431. The court recognized, however, that due
diligence may be considered when evaluating the laches defense. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 431 (reasoning that New York is a center for the art trade and
the better rule would protect owners and deter theft by placing the burden of investi-
gation on the purchaser).
112. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1374.
113. Id. at 1375.
114. See infra note 123 and accompanying text (explaining that art dealers
should more carefully investigate the provenance of artwork before purchasing it).
115. See Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1377-79 (explaining that four Byzantine
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prus initiated an action in replevin after discovering the location of the
mosaics when Goldberg attempted to sell them."6 The court applied
the discovery rule and concluded that the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until the plaintiffs, using due diligence, knew or should
have known the identity of the wrongful possessor."7 The court scruti-
nized Cyprus's actions and determined that it had exercised due dili-
gence in searching for the mosaics."' It further noted that if the dis-
covery rule did not apply, as defendants argued, there was sufficient evi-
dence to indicate the mosaics had been fraudulently concealed for nine
years, thus estopping Goldberg from using the statute of limitations de-
fense."9 The court referred to a principle of Swiss law which presumes
that a purchaser acts in good faith when purchasing property without
knowing it is stolen." Finally, the court examined Goldberg's actions
and held that she did not purchase the mosaics in good faith.' Tradi-
mosaics created in the early sixth century A.D. were inappropriately removed from
the Kankaria church during the Turkish occupation of Cyprus in the 1970s).
116. Id. at 1385. Goldberg had purchased the mosaics from a middleman in
Switzerland who told her that the mosaics had been found in an "extinct" church. Id.
at 1383. Goldberg contacted several art dealers in an attempt to sell the mosaics. Id.
at 1384. The dealers then contacted the Getty Museum in California to see whether
the museum would be interested in purchasing them. Id. Cyprus became aware of the
mosaics' whereabouts through its connections with the Getty Museum and the United
States Department of State. Id.
117. Id. at 1389 (reasoning that it is inconsistent to limit the time in which a
plaintiff can bring suit if he or she could not be aware that a cause of action exists).
118. See id. at 1389 (finding that Cyprus mounted an "organized and systematic
effort" to notify organizations that might have known of the mosaic's existence).
Cyprus had contacted agencies of the United Nations, museums around the world, and
various scholars. Id.
119. See id. at 1392 (discussing the doctrine of fraudulent concealment and
stating that the evidence showed that Cyprus could not reasonably have known the
whereabouts of the mosaics from the time they were stolen until it commenced the
action in 1988). See also Kunstsammlungen, 536 F. Supp. at 852 (stating that a thief
who conceals his possession of a stolen object, making it impossible for the owner to
institute a suit within the limitations period, may be estopped from asserting the stat-
ute of limitations as a defense).
120. See Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1400 (stating that under Swiss law, a
purchaser "acquires superior title to that of an original owner only if he purchases the
property in good faith"). To determine that a purchaser does not act in good faith,
the court must find that the purchaser knew that the seller's title was void or that the
purchaser should have had doubts as to the validity of title. Id.
121. See i& at 1402 (concluding that suspicious circumstances of the sale should
have sent up "red flags" alerting Goldberg as to the mosaics' dubious background).
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tionally, art dealers are presumed to have acted in good faith," but
Autocephalous sets a new standard which requires art dealers to more
thoroughly investigate an artwork's provenance."
In trying to achieve an equitable approach to the application of the
statute of limitations, courts have applied various rules which favor
either the plaintiff or the defendant." The discovery rule, like the ad-
verse possession and demand and refusal rules, favors one litigant over
the other." Critics of the demand and refusal rule argue that it favors
original owners because they can bring suit without regard to the pas-
sage of time.'" If a purchaser could never be secure in her possessory
rights, the free flow of art in the commercial market would be interrupt-
ed." On the other hand, the discovery rule favors the possessor by
placing the burden on original owners to maintain a continual search.'
The circumstances were: (1) Goldberg testified that she was suspicious about the
origins -of the mosaics; (2) the nature of objects themselves-being of a spiritual
nature should have caused a purchaser to check into their provenance; (3) there was a
disparity between the value of the mosaics and the price paid; (4) the fact that the
seller, an "archaeologist," was selling antiquities should have led Goldberg to question
the validity of his claim; (5) the fact that Goldberg knew that the middlemen had
previous criminal convictions; (6) the fact that the sale was consummated very
hastely. Id. at 1400-02.
122. See Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 24 (stating that there is a great-
er likelihood of a judicial finding of good faith where art is purchased through an
antique dealer).
123. See Van Pelt, supra note 8, at 448 n.74 (citing Constance Lowenthal,
executive director for the International Foundation for Art Research in New York
City, as saying that the significance of the Autocephalous decision is that it sets a
new standard for the purchase of antiquities).
124. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1091 (stating that the discovery rule fails to
provide an equitable solution to stolen art cases because it favors one litigant over
another).
125. Id. However, courts in the United States do not exhibit preferential treat-
ment of litigants, but rather attempt to encourage free trade in art while simultaneous-
ly protecting the rightful owners. Id. at 1092.
126. See John G. Petrovich, Comment, Recovery of Stolen Art: Of Painting
Statutes and Statutes of Limitations, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1122, 1140 (1980) (stating
that the demand and refusal rule reduces the repose of innocent purchasers to a nulli-
ty).
127. See Webb, supra note 68, at 894 (stating that prospective purchasers will
not buy if they cannot rely on dealers to pass good title).
128. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1091 (stating that if the original owner carries
the burden of due diligence, he may be required to investigative excessively to recov-
er his property or forfeit his claim to title). See also Webb, supra note 68, at 892
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Courts, in trying to create flexibility, have created inconsistency and
uncertainty.1
29
Ultimately, the applicable law and statute of limitations will be deter-
mined by the jurisdiction that adjudicates the dispute." The dishonest
may have an incentive to "shop" for jurisdictions that would likely rule
in their favor and that have shorter statutory periods.' Additionally,
the courts have not agreed on a standard for the required intensity of a
search to satisfy the due diligence standard." Unclear standards place
a tremendous burden on claimants by forcing them to spend inordinate
amounts of money and time on potentially fruitless investigation."
Furthermore, a rule that burdens the original owner is inconsistent with
the thief rule,"3 which states that a thief cannot pass good title, even
to a good faith purchaser." In such a case, if a good faith purchaser
has paid for stolen property, he or she would not have a claim to valid
title. 1
The Autocephalous case reconciles these differences by closely exam-
(stating that a continual, repetitive search which has proved fruitless over a number of
years creates a burden that few owners are willing to bear).
129. Compare DeWeerth v. Baldinger 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987). cert. de-
nied, 486 U.S. 1056 (finding that contacting authorities and a lawyer was insufficient
to meet the due diligence burden) with Guggenheim v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991) (rejecting the need for any investigation). See also Eisen, supra note
4, at 1091 (indicating that claimants do not know the standards of diligence the court
will place on their searches).
130. Compare DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 103 (holding that the owner, a prominent
art collector, failed to take the necessary steps to locate her property) with O'Keeffe,
416 A.2d 862 (NJ. 1980) (holding that the owner's mere discussion of the missing
art with other art collectors met due diligence standards).
131. See Van Pelt, supra note 8, at 461-62 (describing how illicit dealers "laun-
der" stolen art in jurisdictions which favor purchasers).
132. Compare O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 868 (indicating that the claimant did not
conduct an active search) with DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 688 (noting that the claim-
ant gave up the search after several years). See generally Pinkerton supra note 78
(discussing applicable standards of due diligence in fine art transactions).
133. See Webb, supra note 68, at 892 (stating that most art owners are un-
willing to maintain a prolonged search).
134. Eisen, supra note 4, at 1099.
135. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 867.
136. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1098-99 (noting that under the thief rule, a
thief cannot pass good title to a purchaser). See also, JAIMES J. WHrIE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 173 (3d ed. 1988) (quoting U.C.C. § 2-403
1989).
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ining both the actions of the plaintiffs and those of the defendants."7
With both parties required to establish good faith through the exercise of
due diligence, the law comes closer to providing an equitable remedy. A
uniform set of rules is nonetheless needed, not only in the United States
where there is inconsistent application of rules among the states, but
also internationally, where the civil laws of some nations conflict with
the common law of others.
3
8
II. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS
A. THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1954
Legislative concern for the protection of cultural property originated in
the sixteenth century in Europe. 139 Yet, destruction and plundering of
art treasures was commonplace and considered legitimate in wartime
until the mid-eighteenth century.' At that time, a rule of war emerged
which prohibited the wanton destruction of cultural property and called
for the preservation of artistic treasures during war. 4' Although rulers
and military leaders of the time ignored the rule,' it eventually
evolved into a legal principle embodied in international agreements
regulating armed conflicts.""
137. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
138. See Bolano, supra note 25, at 131 (calling for uniform standards to over-
come the inconsistencies in the application of law and equity in United States courts).
139. Prott, supra note 5, at 333 n.l.
140. Jore, supra note 19, at 61. See also Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 288 (ex-
plaining that the ancient Romans considered "booty" to be a legitimate by-product of
war).
141. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 288 (quoting Emheric de Vattel who, in
1758, stated that art treasures should not be subjected to the ravages of war because
they "do honour to human society").
142. See id. (explaining that during the Napoleonic Wars, occupying French
forces systematically removed art treasures of other nations). After the wars, France
tried to retain the confiscated property. Id. Dispossessed nations, however, required the
repatriation of confiscated property, stating that it was contrary to the rules of war to
keep it. Id. at 288.
143. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 288-89 (examining subsequent international
agreements for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict).
Since the Napoleonic Wars, a fundamental rule has evolved that seeks "to preserve
what can now be called the inalienable right of all peoples to their natural cultural
heritage"). See also Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215, reprinted in JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICs AND THE VISUAL ARTS, 28-29
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The primary treaty for the protection of cultural property in wartime
is the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict.' The 1954 Hague Convention, ratified
by seventy-two nations,' 5 rests on the premise that cultural property is
a valuable possession of humankind." It follows earlier agreements,
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which forbid the destruction
or seizure of enemy property unless necessary in times of war." The
goal of the 1954 Convention is to protect more specifically a nation's
cultural property during armed conflict." The Preamble to the Hague
Convention states that "damage to cultural property belonging to any
people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind,
since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world.""
Article 3 of the 1954 Hague Convention requires each nation to take
protective action in peacetime to protect cultural property within its
territory in case of war.'" Article 4 provides that each nation must re-
spect cultural property in its own territory and in the territory of other
nations. Also, in wartime, occupying forces must protect cultural proper-
ty in the subject territory regardless of whether that territory has taken
protective measures." Article 7 of the Hague Convention requires sig-
natories to promote rules necessary "to foster in the members of their
armed forces a spirit of respect" for the culture of all peoples."
While the 1954 Hague Convention is broad enough to promote re-
(1987).
144. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. See Ed-
wards, supra note 5 (discussing the historical development of the Hague Convention).
145. Edwards, supra note 5, at 939.
146. See id. at 945 (stating that the 1954 Hague Convention attempts to codify
the principle that cultural property deserves protection for the good of humankind).
147. The Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of NYar on Land,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 403, The Convention regarding the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539. Both Conventions
provide that "[tihe property of communes, that of religious, charitable, and educational
institutions, and those of arts and science, even when State property, shall be treated
as private property." Id
148. Edwards, supra note 5, at 946; Hague Convention, supra note 144, at
Preamble.
149. Hague Convention, supra note 144, Preamble.
150. Id art. 3.
151. Id. art. 4.
152. Id art. 7.
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spect for cultural property during armed conflicts,' it is not specific
enough to address the question of restitution."M This shortcoming
leaves dispossessed owners to search for other options to regain their
stolen property." Furthermore, the Convention calls for each party to
prosecute and impose penal sanctions against violators but leaves each
nation to create its own penal .sanctions.'" The Hague Convention at-
tempts to protect cultural property during war, but it does little to pro-
vide a coherent body of law to assist in combatting the illicit trade in
art.
B. THE UNESCO CONVENTION
In response to the growing international concern about the extensive
pillaging of archaeological and ethnological material in source coun-
tries,'57 and the influx of stolen antiquities on the art market,' the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) promulgated the Convention for Prohibiting and Preventing
the Illicit Import, and Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property in 1970.'"' The UNESCO Convention is the major internation-
al treaty"w for the protection of cultural property during peacetime and
153. See Edwards, supra note 5 (stating that the Hague Convention is very
broad in scope in that it applies to all forms of armed conflict between contracting
parties regardless of whether a party recognizes the state of war).
154. See Nahlik, supra note 8, at 1082.
155. See id. at 1083 (stating that the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law attributes the difficulty of formulating acceptable provisions for restitution
to the differences between civil and common law countries).
156. Id. at 1081. The 1954 Hague Convention, however, differs from the Con-
ventions of 1899 and 1907 in that it calls for the criminal prosecution of violators.
Hague Convention supra note 144, art. 56.
157. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 3, at 304; BATOR, supra note 1, at 6. See
supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (discussing the international scope of the
illicit art trade).
158. BATOR, supra note 1, at 6.
159. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import
and Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property Nov. 14, 1970, 823
U.N.T.S. 231, 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971) [hereinafter UNESCO Convention].
160. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 299 (terming the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion a "multilateral treaty of primary significance"); Prott, supra note 5, at 338 (de-
scribing the 1970 UNESCO Convention as a "major international legal agreement").
See also LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 3, at 304 (noting the comprehensive nature
of the UNESCO Convention).
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is a cornerstone' of United States policy regarding stolen international
art. The UNESCO Convention prohibits the importation of cultural prop-
erty illegally exported or stolen from a foreign nation." Although
there are seventy signatory members to the treaty," the United States
is the first and only major "market nation"' ' to implement it." The
preamble to the UNESCO Convention, like that of the Hague Conven-
tion, propounds the legal principle that cultural property belongs to
humankind and invokes the "moral" obligation of all nations to protect
human cultural heritage." Also, like the Hague Convention, it requires
member states to protect their property intemally.'"
Article 6 of the UNESCO Convention requires that each exporting
country provide an appropriate certificate to accompany all cultural
property exported and to prohibit exportation of items that have no
certificate." Article 7(a) requires members, consistent with their na-
tional legislation, to prevent museums and similar institutions within
their territory from acquiring cultural property "illegally removed from
another country."'" Article 7(b) prohibits member countries from im-
porting cultural property stolen from a museum, religious or public
monument or similar institution."r The UNESCO Convention, unlike
the Hague Convention, provides for restitution of the illegally exported
object." Article 7(b)(ii) requires the importing country to take steps to
recover and return the property to the requesting state provided that the
bona fide purchaser receives just compensation."
161. Hingston, supra note 3, at 1.
162. UNESCO Convention, supra note 159, art. 3.
163. HIngston, supra note 3, at 10 (setting forth a list of parties to the
UNESCO Convention). See Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 4 (explaining
that the United States supported the UNESCO Convention for foreign policy reasons
and because it was sensitive to the pillaging of art-source nations).
164. See infra notes 189-213 and accompanying text (discussing the competing
values of source and market nations).
165. See I-lngston, supra note 3, at 10 (explaining that the United States' with-
drawal from UNESCO did not alter its commitment to the policies set forth in the
1970 Convention).
166. UNESCO Convention, supra note 159, Preamble.
167. UNESCO Convention, supra note 159, Preamble.
168. UNESCO Convention, supra note 159, Preamble.
169. UNESCO Convention, supra note 159, art. 7(a).
170. UNESCO Convention, supra note 159, art. 7(b).
171. UNESCO Convention, supra note 159, art. 7(b)(ii).
172. UNESCO Convention, supra note 159.
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After lengthy delay, the United States ratified the UNESCO Conven-
tion in 1983"3 with implementing legislation. This legislation modi-
fied the original UNESCO Convention and severely limited its applica-
tion.75 First, the implementing legislation narrowly defines the types of
articles and situations covered.76 An object will not be considered cul-
tural property under these definitions unless it is of cultural significance,
at least 250 years old, discovered in an excavation, and a product of
tribal or non-industrial society.' Second, for the import restrictions to
apply, these objects must have been inventoried in public institutions.'
Third, the implementing legislation severely restricts emergency applica-
tion of the UNESCO Convention.'79 These reservations took much of
the bite out of the UNESCO Convention, making it largely ineffec-
tive."
173. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 3, at 304-05 (attributing the eleven-
year delay to the fact that the United States is an art-importing country).
174. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C.S. § 2601
(1983) [hereinafter Implementation Act].
175. See Prott, supra note 5, at 339 (discussing the amendments to the Conven-
tion made by those countries, particularly the United States, which had problems with
its original wording). See also Douglas N. Thomason, Rolling Back History: The
United Nations General Assembly and the Right to Cultural Property, 22 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 47 (1990) (discussing the General Assembly debate surrounding the
amendments to the original Convention).
176. 19 U.S.C. § 2601 (1983). The legislative history, however, indicates that
the term "cultural property" was meant to include other articles falling outside the
categories listed in Article 1. See S. REP. No. 564, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 108 (stating that cultural property is defined to include
the categories of objects listed in article 1 of the UNESCO Convention, whether or
not the object is specifically designated by the state party for this purpose). The term
thus is broader than, but includes "archaeological or ethnological material." Id. Items
outside of the definition in article 1 are not required to be accompanied by a cer-
tificate of authorization. Edwards, supra note 5, at 928.
177. 19 U.S.C. § 2601 (1983).
178. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2607, 2610 (2)(A) (1983). This may be a difficult condition
to impose on any country because of the enormous amount of time and resources re-
quired to inventory vast amounts of art. Prott, supra note 5, at 341.
179. See 19 U.S.C. § 2602 (1983) (limiting the President's power to enter into
a bilateral or multilateral agreement with a state under article 9 of the UNESCO
Convention by requiring requests to be made in writing, measures to be taken to
protect the property, agreements to be limited to five years, and other importing na-
tions must apply the same restrictions).
180. Edwards, supra note 5, at 929. See also S. ExEc. REP. No. 29, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1972) (declaring that the UNESCO Convention is understood to
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Furthermore, the UNESCO Convention does not include any binding
provisions for resolving problems.'8' The language is vague' "
throughout the text, possibly in an effort to gain signatures to the trea-
ty." This vague language'" promotes inconsistency both at the level
of incorporation into domestic law and in the courtroom where it is sub-
ject to judicial interpretation." Although the preamble, like the Hague
Convention, asserts the policy that cultural property belongs to human-
kind,'8 most art market states are unwilling to cooperate at an inter-
national level to permit repatriation of acquired cultural property without
modifications to the UNESCO Convention.' Significantly absent from
UNESCO signatories are most Western European countries and Japan.
These nations believe that the convention lacks adequate protection for
good faith purchases of art"
MI. ILLICIT WORLD TRADE IN STOLEN CULTURAL PROPERTY
AND COMPETING POLICIES THAT PREVENT INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT
Many commentators and experts in the art world are concerned with
the continuing problem of illicit art trade and warn that the practice of
plundering of archaelogical sites is growing at an alarming rate.'"
apply only to institutions under federal control).
181. Edwards, supra note 5, at 929. In fact, article 7(b) conflicts with common
law principles because it does not take into account the rule that a good faith pur-
chaser cannot take title from a thief.
182. See Ann P. Prunty, Toward Establishing an International Tribunal for the
Settlement of Cultural Property Disputes: How to Keep Greece from Losing its Mar-
bles, 72 GEO. L.J. 1155, 1159-60 (1984) (noting the ambiguous character of the
Convention's terms).
183. Prott, supra note 5, at 339.
184. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 159, art. 7 (requiring parties to "un-
dertake: (a) [t]o take the necessary measures, consistent with national legisla-
tion .... " (emphasis added)).
185. Prott, supra note 5, at 339-44.
186. UNESCO Convention, supra note 159, Preamble. See also Hague Conven-
tion, supra note 144.
187. See Prott, supra note 5, at 339-40 (noting the reluctance of countries to
ratify the UNESCO Convention without modifications).
188. Jerome M. Eisenberg, UNIDROIT, the EC, and the International Trade in
Antiquities, MINERVA, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 19; Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at
9.
189. See BATOR, supra note 1, at 13 (stating that experts generally agree that
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They argue that there are few effective controls"9 and that the illegal
trade in stolen cultural property is beyond the ability of any one state to
control.' They call for a concerted effort by all nations to protect the
world's cultural heritage.'"
To date, however, competing values and differing philosophies among
art-importing and art-exporting nations' have prevented international
cooperation.'" The world can be generally divided into two groups of
looting at archaeological sites is occurring more frequently, but noting the lack of
systematic studies on the matter). But see Clemency Coggins, Illicit Traffic of
Pre-Columbian Antiquities, ART J. (1969) (reporting the systematic plundering of na-
tional art treasures).
190. See BATOR, supra note 1, at 34 (asserting that the three methods of pre-
venting stolen art from moving freely in the international market: (1) physical protec-
tion at the site of the property; (2) deterrence through fear of punishment; and (3)
elimination of economic incentives); see also Van Pelt, supra note 8, at 443 (outlin-
ing the three avenues for recovery of stolen cultural property available under United
States Law: (1) international treaties that call for the physical protection of cultural
property, (2) the National Stolen Property Act which attempts to deter theft through
punishment, and (3) civil litigation whereby the original owner may sue the possessor
of his stolen property and demand restitution-this, in theory, should diminish eco-
nomic incentives). The United States is one of the few countries that does not have
laws which regulate or restrict the sale or export of national cultural objects. Memo-
randum, supra note 29 at 6. The United States has two statutes which seek to protect
archeological resources on public or Indian Lands: Archeological Resources Protection
Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1988); and Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (1988). These statutes focus on preventing the removal
of artifacts from certain protected sites and do not focus on exportation of the ob-
jects. Id.
191. See Rogers, supra note 57, at 933 (stating that the economically poor,
antiquities-rich source nations do not have adequate resources to stop the flow of
their cultural property to capital-rich nations); see also Eisen, supra note 4, at 1068
(explaining that many source countries lack the economic and political power to pro-
tect their property).
192. See Prott, supra note 5, at 337 (claiming that all countries share an inter-
est in preventing theft of artwork); see also Hingston, supra note 3, at I (describing
the message of the Chairman of the President's Cultural Property Advisory Committee
which calls upon the international community to join the United States in a concerted
effort to protect the world's cultural heritage).
193. See BATOR, supra note 1, at 26-31 (discussing the values of nations es-
pousing the theory of national patrimony); see also Rogers, supra note 57, at 936
(discussing the values of art-importing nations).
194. See Van Pelt, supra note 8, at 460 (noting that many countries are willing
to implement legislation to curb illicit traffic in stolen art); see also Jore, supra note
19, at 68-74 (discussing the various roadblocks to enforcement of illegal export of
cultural property).
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countries, source nations and market nations.' " Historically, these two
types of nations have had competing interests that determine which in-
ternational agreements they have been willing to ratify.'"
Source nations are those whose supply of cultural property exceeds
internal demand for the property.' Source nations espouse the doctrine
of "cultural patrimony" often seeking repatriation of their cultural prop-
erty because they believe that it constitutes part of their cultural heri-
tage.'" These nations are often poor and lack adequate resources to
protect their property from looters and physical deterioration." They
often seek the repatriation of articles removed in violation of their ex-
port laws.' Most nations, however, are unwilling to enforce another
country's laws absent a treaty or internal laws prohibiting such ac-
tion."'
Market nations seek to protect the free market of trade and generally
oppose repatriation. These nations believe that cultural artifacts be-
195. John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 831, 832 (1986). See also Explanatory Report, supra note 26. at 10
(discussing market theory and cultural nationalism). However, some countries may be
both source and market nations, promoting the free market in art as a method to
adjust a monetary imbalance, or to effect social or political purposes. Interview with
Harold S. Burman, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, in Washington
D.C. (Nov. 2, 1993).
196. See generally Thomason, supra note 175 (discussing the United Nations
General Assembly debate concerning the repatriation of cultural property). See also
LERNER & BRESLE, supra note 3, at 65 (explaining that source countries wish to
protect cultural heritage whereas market nations favor the free flow of the art trade).
197. Merryman, supra note 195, at 832.
198. See Rogers, supra note 57, at 935-36.
199. See BATOR, supra note 1, at 21 (explaining that some Western collectors
and museum officials have argued that because capital-rich countries often have exper-
tise not available in many antiquity-rich countries, the practice of exporting antiquities
has "materially aided the preservation of the artistic patrimony of mankind").
200. Rogers, supra note 57, at 935-36. The division is not always clear-cut,
however. In some countries, exportation of resources is acknowledged as a method of
shoring up a failing economy. Thus, sometimes art is exported from Third World
countries with the complicity of government officials. Interview with Harold S.
Burman, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, in Washington, D.C. (Nov.
2, 1993).
201. See Jore, supra note 19, at 69; see also infra notes 211-13 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the lack of jurisdictional provisions in international agreements
governing cultural property).
202. See Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 10 (stating that capital-rich
countries seek to promote free trade in art because of the economic investment oppor-
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long to "common human culture,"2 and that they should be available
for the world community to enjoy.24 These countries have noted their
concern that source nations may not have an infrastructure by which the
articles can be properly safeguarded and displayed.'w More recently,
the political debate based on these two doctrines has merged and all
nations recognize the legitimacy of both positions.2' Nonetheless, sev-
eral unresolved issues have prevented the formulation of an international
solution.
First, many civil law countries believe that protecting the bona fide
purchaser is an essential element of free commerce while statutes in the
United States and common law prevent a thief from passing good title
even to a good faith purchaser.' Furthermore, art dealers, eager to
protect the art market, have successfully lobbied against legislation that
would impose stricter controls on the market."° Additionally, museums
in these nations are full of cultural property of unknown provenance.2"
They fear that requiring repatriation of all cultural property would result
in an exodus of art out of the world's great museums, and would limit
the free flow of art in the international market."' These competing val-
ues must be considered by policymakers in the United States as they
formulate a national position concerning stolen artwork.
tunities and because of the belief that the circulation of cultural art throughout the
world will promote dialogue among cultures and ultimately lead to peace among na-
tions).
203. Merryman, supra note 195, at 831.
204. Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 10.
205. See Rogers, supra note 57, at 936 (noting that some antiquities which
would deteriorate or be destroyed if left in a source country may be preserved if
moved to a capital-rich country).
206. Thomason, supra note 175.
207. Interview with Harold S. Burman, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department
of State, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 2, 1993). See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note
136 (discussing the U.C.C. provisions which prohibit a good faith purchaser from
taking good title from a thief). See also infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text
(explaining choice of law issues between civil and common law countries).
208. Jore, supra note 19, at 74.
209. See Rogers, supra note 57, at 936 (quoting a commentator who describes
United States museums as "omnivorous").
210. See United States v. McLain, 545 F.2d 988 (1977) (reasoning that although
the court recognizes a foreign country's sovereign right to declare ownership of its
cultural property, giving effect to such declaration of all art exported since 1897
would put art dealers out of work and threaten museum collections in the United
States).
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Choice of law issues further complicate international art theft cases.
Courts apply their own domestic laws2 ' because international agree-
ments lack provisions explicitly delineating jurisdictional authority in
international disputes. Common law nations tend to protect the rights of
the original owner, while civil law countries favor the bona fide pur-
chaser over the original owner.21 Some commentators argue that civil
laws, which make it easier for a purchaser to acquire valid title of sto-
len property, may actually encourage theft by allowing thieves to "laun-
der" stolen art.23
IV. THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION: ANALYSIS OF A POSSIBLE
SOLUTION TO COMPETING INTERESTS
Facing the ineffectiveness of article 7(b) of the UNESCO Conven-
tion,"' UNESCO requested that the Institute for the Unification of Pri-
211. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 286-87 (noting that conflict of laws is-
sues-questions concerning which nation's law governs in a given dispute-frustrate
the international cooperation needed to control illicit traffic in cultural artifacts).
212. See Explanatory Report, supra note 26. at 19 (reporting that common law
countries follow the "thief" rule-one cannot give what one does not have-while
most civil law nations give greater protection to the bona fide purchaser); see also
Bolano, supra note 25, at 165 (describing the conflicting interests of common law
countries which follow the principle that a thief cannot pass good title to a purchaser
and civil law countries which follow the general rule that a purchaser can acquire
good title from a thief on a showing of good faith).
213. See Van Pelt, supra note 8, at 461 (stating that civil courts in many na-
tions protect the bona fide purchaser thereby encouraging theft by allowing thieves to
launder stolen art (citing Winkworth v. Christie's Ltd., I All ER 1121 (1980)).
Artwork was stolen from the Plaintiff in England and taken to Italy and sold under
Italian contract law which allows defective title to convey as good title provided the
purchaser is not aware of the illegality of the sale. Id. See also Jason Bennetto,
Loophole Lets Markets Sell Stolen Goods, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 9, 1992, at 6 (reporting
that Britain still has an antiquated law on the books which allows people who buy
goods from an open market ("market overt") to acquire good title to the items, even
if they are stolen). This fifteenth century law was instituted to protect innocent buyers
from incurring liability. Id. Defendants, therefore, will often argue that they have good
title under foreign law. See generally Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind.
1989) (defendant arguing that Swiss law applied); Kunsisammnhmngen Zii Weimar, 678
F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982) (defendant arguing that German law applied). When given a
choice of law issue, United States courts apply domestic law, usually in favor of the
original owner. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987); Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp.
1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Kuntsammulungen Zu Weimar, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
214. See Burman Memorandum, supra note 29 (stating that to date, the United
States and Canada are the only major market nation members of the UNESCO Con-
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vate Law (UNIDROIT) draft a new convention concerning stolen cultur-
al property. '  UNIDROIT's purpose is to establish a new
framework 1 6 to govern the restitution of stolen cultural objects"7 and
to reconcile differences between civil and common law nations, thereby
gaining significant number of signatory members."8 The UNIDROIT
Convention differs from the UNESCO Convention in important ways.
The UNESCO Convention is premised on each sovereign's right to
apply import restrictions on cultural property and seize illegally imported
articles. 9 It is also discretionary in its application' and litigation is
vention and the absence of other market countries like Japan, the United Kingdom,
France, and Switzerland has limited the effectiveness of the UNESCO Convention);
see also, Explanatory Report, supra note 26 (attributing the unacceptability of
UNESCO Article 7(b) to its incompatibility with many countries' national laws).
215. 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27.
Prompted by organizations like UNESCO, UNIDROIT first undertook to study the
international protection of cultural property at its 65th session in April 1986. Id. The
study, by Gerte Reichelt, of the Vienna Institute of Comparative Law, examined civil
law, private international law, and public law aspects of the problem and submitted
recommendations to UNIDROIT and to UNESCO in 1987. Id. Following a second
study by Reichelt, the UNIDROIT Governing Council established a study group to
determine the possibility of drafting uniform rules to address the international protec-
tion of cultural property. Id. At the conclusion of its third meeting in January 1990,
the study group had drafted the text of the Preliminary Draft UNIDROIT Convention
on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Property. Interview with Rosalia J. Gonzales,
Executive Assistant, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International
Law, in Washington, D.C. (July 14, 1992).
216. See Explanatory Report, supra note 26 (stating that "the principal aim of
the future Convention is to establish as clear and simple a regime as possible to
govern the restitution of stolen cultural objects to the dispossessed person and the
return of an object exported in violation of a prohibition of the State whose laws
have been contravened").
217. 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27. The
Conventions set out separate provisions for the return of stolen cultural property and
for the return of illegally exported cultural property. This Comment limits its discus-
sion to the restitution of stolen cultural property and its impact on United States
domestic law.
218. See Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 3 (stating that the biggest ob-
stacle is striking a balance between common law systems which follow the thief rule
and the civil law countries which protect good faith purchasers).
219. Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 4.
220. See Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 4 (stating that countries must
request a federal agency to intervene on their behalf; the agency therefore has discre-
tion as to whether it will restrict importation).
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usually not successful." The UNIDROIT Convention, on the other
hand, is not discretionary.' It greatly expands the rights of foreign
governments seeking the return of illegally exported property' by pro-
viding them with private litigation rights without United States govern-
ment intercession.2' Furthermore, it attempts to balance the interests Qf
dispossessed owners and bona fide purchasers by requiring restitution of
the stolen object and compensation to purchasers when they have exer-
cised the necessary due diligence.'
A. RESTITUTION OF STOLEN CULTURAL OBJECTS
Article 3 of the UNIDROIT Convention requires the possessor of a
stolen cultural object to return it.' Article 3 stipulates that a claimant
must bring an action for restitution within three years or five years'
of the time he knew or should reasonably have knownm the location
or identity of the possessor or object, and proposes a maximum time
period in which a claim can be brought of six, ten, thirty, or fifty
years.' This provision is not concerned with the good faith of the
purchaser/possessor; return of the object is mandatory. It also insures
some security for the possessor by setting the limitations period at a
221. Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 4.
222. Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 4.
223. Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 4.
224. Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 4.
225. See supra notes 90-138 and accompanying text (discussing the due dili-
gence standard).
226. 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art.
3(1).
227. 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art.
3(1). The 1990 Draft Convention proposed that restitution be brought within a period
of three years. The 1993 Draft Convention contains language which the committee is
still debating; it has been proposed that the restitution period be extended to five
years. Id.
228. 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art. 3(3). The language "or ought
reasonably to have known" is still being debated.
229. 1990 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art. 3(2) (providing that "any claim
for the restitution of a stolen cultural object shall be brought within a period of three
years from the time when the claimant knew or ought reasonably to have known the
location, or the identity of the possessor, of the object, and in any case within a
period of thirty years from the time of the theft"). Id. The 1993 Draft Convention,
however, includes possible maximum periods of either six, ten, thirty, or fifty years
from the time of the theft. 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art. 3(2).
230. Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 19.
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maximum time in which the original owner can bring a claim.23'
By setting a maximum time limit, article 3 of the UNIDROIT Con-
vention attempts to provide a compromise which will provide a purchas-
er a certain degree of security when purchasing an art object in good
faith. This compromise should appeal to the legal systems of Western
Europe which are built on the fidelity of the commercial transaction.2"
Some commentators, however, fear that a time limitation will encourage
fraudulent concealment. 3 Artwork, unlike most movable objects, in-
creases in value over time.' Arguably, therefore, a thief or dishonest
investor who is not concerned about the provenance of an object could
conceal it for thirty years and a day and then reap a high profit after
the statute of limitations expires. Article 11, however, allows nations the
flexibility to extend the limitations period according to its own "national
law" when it is beneficial to the claimant.' Thus, in the situation
where a thief or possessor has concealed an object in bad faith, article
11(a)(ii) would allow an adjudicating body to apply a longer limitations
period if its national law would permit such an extension. 6 This pro-
vision could apply to situations similar to the Quedlinburg case, where
231. Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 10. During debate on the 1990
Draft Convention, two statutory time limits were included: the shorter period seeks to
acquire more signatures of importing nations, the longer period seeks to gain the
signatures of art-exporting nations. Id. See also Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at
21 (stating that the longer limitation period was included because of the speculative
nature of art). The 1993 Draft Convention proposes three possible time periods. 1990
Draft Convention, supra note 27, art. 3(2).
232. Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 9.
233. See Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 9 (stating that some
art-importing countries as well as some American commentators and courts oppose
this provision because it may encourage thefts by those who are in a position to con-
ceal art objects).
234. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the rapid increase in
art values that have apparently led to the illicit trade).
235. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 33, art. 11 (providing that "[e]ach
Contracting State shall remain free in respect of claims brought before its courts or
competent authorities: (a) for the restitution of a stolen cultural object: (i) to extend
the provisions of Chapter II to acts other than theft whereby the claimant has wrong-
fully been deprived of possession of the object; (ii) to apply its national law when
this would permit an extension of the period within which a claim for restitution of
the object may be brought under article 3(2); (iii) to apply its national law when this
would disallow the possessor's right to compensation even when the possessor has
exercised the necessary diligence contemplated by article 4(1)).




the treasures were hidden for more than forty years m if the claimant
could show that the property had been fraudulently concealed. Thus,
although article 3 will arguably not cover all circumstances where a
thief will fraudulently conceal a piece of artwork, it is designed to cover
the largest number of situations possible.
Article 3 of the UNIDROIT Convention, therefore, can be reconciled
with the U.S. common law doctrine of fraudulent concealment if "na-
tional law" can be interpreted to mean United States common lawY5 A
U.S. court could then excuse a claimant's delay in bringing a suit be-
cause the doctrine of fraudulent concealment would estop the possessor
from invoking the statute of limitations."
An interpretation of article 11, however, that permits courts to focus
on the good or bad faith of the possessor is contrary to the intent of
article 3, which requires restitution regardless of the good faith of the
possessor. On the other hand, such an interpretation would support
one of the overall goals of the UNIDROIT Convention: deterring bad
faith acquisitions of illicitly obtained cultural property."' Although this
interpretation of article 11 would bring article 3 and its strict limitations
period provision in line with United States common law, it would un-
dermine the uniformity of the Convention." To the extent that the
limitations period would be enforced differently in the various countries,
dishonest purchasers who can afford to wait thirty years may be encour-
aged to forum shop for a jurisdiction where domestic law favors the
purchasers with a strict adherence to the thrity-year limitations peri-
od. 3
237. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text (discussing the title dispute
over stolen artwork that had resurfaced after forty years of concealment).
238. See Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1391-92 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (applying
common law rules of discovery and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment).
239. Id.
240. See supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text (explaining that article 3 of
the UNIDRO1T Convention is not concerned with a purchaser's good or bad faith).
241. See supra notes 90-138 (discussing the equitable considerations of a good
faith purchaser and the effect of these considerations on the art market); see also
Jore, supra note 19, at 79 (arguing that tighter controls on purchasers of art would
devastate the art market).
242. See Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 38 (discussing the careful draft-
ing of Article 11 to balance competing interests without compromising, to too great
an extent, the uniformity sought).
243. See supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text (discussing art "laundering"
in jurisdictions with more lenient laws towards the bona fide purchaser).
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Article 3(4) may present an obstacle to ratification by the United
States of the UNIDROIT Convention. This proposed provision provides
that a separate rule for restitution be applied to public collections,
granting an extention of time for bringing a claim to seventy-five
years.' The United States is one of the few countries where relatively
little cultural property is held by governmentally funded institutions. As
a result, it opposes granting additional rights of return to governmentally
held cultural property.' 4 Rather, the United States would prefer to
broaden the protection for private collections, a proposal which is op-
posed by Western European countries.'
B. COMPENSATION TO THE GOOD FAITH PURCHASER
Under article 4, the good faith of a purchaser/possessor is a factor in
determining whether he or she would receive compensation upon return
of the object. ' 7 This provision states that a purchaser who is required
to return an object is entitled to "fair and reasonable" compensation if
he can show that he exercised due diligence in discovering the piece's
provenance when acquiring it.' The due diligence is determined by
circumstances surrounding the purchase, including the character of the
parties, the price paid for the object, and whether a register was consult-
ed.
249
244. 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art. 3(4).
245. Request for Comments on the Revised Draft UNIDROIT Convention on the
International Protection of Cultural Property: U.S. Positions for the Fourth UNIDROIT
Meeting, from Harold S. Burman, Office of Legal Adviser, Department of State (Aug.
26, 1993) [hereinafter Request for Comments].
246. Id.
247. 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27. Article
4 provides: (1) The possessor required to return a stolen cultural object shall be enti-
tled to fair and reasonable compensation by the claimant provided that the possessor
exercised the necessary diligence when acquiring the object; (2) In determining wheth-
er the possessor exercised such diligence, the court shall consider the relevant circum-
stances of the acquisition, including the character of the parties, the price paid, and
whether the possessor consulted any accessible register of stolen cultural objects which
it could reasonably have consulted. (3) The conduct of a predecessor from whom the
possessor has acquired the cultural object by inheritance or otherwise gratuitously shall
be imputed to the possessor. Id.
248. 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27.
249. Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 23 (explaining that the UNIDROIT
study group considered the question of burden of proof several times and ultimately
decided to place the burden on the possessor).
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Although the concept of compensation to the possessor of a stolen
object is new to the United States,' the principles behind article 4 are
consistent with recent developments in United States common law'
In the most recent cases, Guggenheim v. Lubell and Autocephalous
Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine
Arts," the courts shifted the burden of investigation to the purchasers,
requiring them to take significant steps to determine the legitimacy of
the object's title.' Article 4 of the UNIDROIT Convention incorpo-
rates the principles of the discovery rule and due diligence consider-
ations when determining whether the purchaser is entitled to compensa-
tion.' Article 3 expects due diligence of the original owner by requir-
ing him or her to make a claim within three or five years of locating
the object and by setting a maximum claim period of six, ten, thirty, or
fifty years.' Together, articles 3 and 4 balance the rights of good
faith purchasers and the rights of the owners and are consistent with
common law principles.
The provision requiring the claimant to compensate the good faith
purchaser upon return of an object does not have an equivalent in Unit-
250. See Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 10; Edwards, supra note 5. at
165-71 (reconciling the concept of compensation provided for within the UNESCO
Convention with United States common law). In a common law action of replevin, in
order to protect the property rights of the original owner, a court may compel an
innocent purchaser to return the stolen item without compensation. Id. A treaty per-
mitting compensation to the purchaser would be compatible with common law princi-
ples if it focuses on whether the purchase was in good faith. Id. It would permit the
item to be returned without compensation if the purchaser did not acquire it in good
faith. Id. United States courts have reached this same result in recent replevin cases
where the focus has been on the good faith of the purchaser. See also supra notes
90-138 and accompanying text (discussing courts' shift toward focusing on whether
the purchaser exercised due diligence).
251. See supra notes 90-138 and accompanying text (discussing the development
of the due diligence rule to require purchasers to investigate the provenance of
artwork).
252. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
253. 253. 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
254. See Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 431 (holding that placing the burden of
investigation on the wronged owner is inappropriate and that placing this burden upon
the potential purchaser provides greater protection for the owner). See also
Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1374 (holding that suspicious circumstances of the
sale should have alerted the purchaser to the dubious background of the mosaics).
255. 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art. 4.
256. 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3.
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ed States law."? The UNIDROIT drafters included it to attract more
civil law countries, " which generally provide more protection to the
bona fide purchaser.' The UNIDROIT Convention does not give
much guidance in determining the amount of compensation to be paid.
The Convention's language is intentionally vague' to allow judicial
discretion in assessing the factors which may determine a fair and rea-
sonable amount."
A weakness of article 4 is its necessary diligence standard, requiring
purchasers to consult with "any accessible register of stolen cultural
objects which could reasonably have been consulted.""26 Several inter-
national foundations have registries for stolen artwork.' In its current
257. Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 10. See supra notes 19 and 250
and accompanying text (discussing the concept of compensation and its compatibility
with United States common law).
258. Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 10.
259. Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 20.
260. See Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 22 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the various objections to this provision and the UNIDROIT study group's
conclusion that this language allows judicial discretion according to each case).
261. Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 22. The language does not state
whether the value paid should be the purchase price, the fair market price, or the
intrinsic value or whether it should include other costs, i.e., insurance, transportation
costs, etc. Id. Some members of the study group, particularly concerned about poorer
countries' ability to pay, complained that the language allows judges too much discre-
tion. Id. However, the study group concluded that the language would permit a judge
to take a nation's resources into consideration. Id.
262. 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art. 4.
263. See Hingston, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that the International Foundation
for Art Research (IFAR) and INTERPOL, the inter-European police investigation agen-
cy, maintain registries of stolen art); see also Prott, supra note 5, at 346 (calling for
purchasers to check a central international registry as a precaution to buying artwork
of unknown provenance); Nick Nuttall, supra note 2 (discussing the new computer
registers opened in 1991 by the International Art Loss Register, and Lasemet Theft
Line which log images and descriptions of art on a computer base); Morris, supra
note 5, at 75 (arguing that an international art registry is necessary to immediately
provide custom officials with an accurate description of the stolen artwork). The au-
thor suggests that owners of art. be required to provide a central registry with a
photograph-like image of the art taken with a digital camera. Morris, supra note 5, at
74. The image can be stored in the computer, providing officials with an instant
description of the object. Morris, supra note 5, at 74-75. See also Harriet Crawley,
Hi-tech Sleuths Who Take Art Off the Fence: Harriet Crawley Visits the Belgravia
Border from which Brigadier Emson Traces Stolen Art, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1992, at
14-15 (reporting that the computerized system is increasingly used by police and has
had extraordinary success in tracking down stolen art). But see Explanatory Report,
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form, the UNIDROIT Convention does not require that a specific regis-
try be consulted.' Instead, it simply lists consultation as one of the
factors courts should consider in determining whether the purchaser
exercised good faith.' The term "any registry" is vague enough to
allow a dishonest dealer to consult an obscure registry unknown to the
original owner. Some critics have argued that the agreement should be
specific enough to provide for uniform interpretation of the provi-
sions.' For practical and political reasons, however, it would be im-
possible to propose one central registry.'
Article 4 may present another difficulty for the United States' imple-
mentation of UNIDROIT. Article 4 alters, as a matter of a treaty ob-
ligation, the burden of proof required by the possesor in establishing
that he or she exercised due diligence when purchasing artwork. These
burden of poof requirements may need to be reconciled with those al-
ready established in the Uniform Commercial Code.
Article 4(3) imputes a predecessor's conduct on a possessor who
acquires the object by inheritance or gift.' Drafters included this pro-
vision in response to concerns over acquisitions of museums from do-
nors without title.' This article would also provide protection against
an individual passing stolen artwork through his or her estateY"' This
supra note 26, at 24 (expressing concerns about the inaccessibility and ineffectiveness
of currently available registers).
264. See Franklin Feldman & Bonnie Burnham, An Art Theft Archive: Principles
and Realization, 10 CoNN. L. REV. 702 (1978) (noting the need for an art-theft ar-
chive); see also Deborah D. Hoover, Title Disputes in the Art Market: An Emerging
Duty of Care for Art Merchants, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 443 (1983) (discussing the
resources available for investigating stolen art and calling for a requirement that art
dealers use the existing registries).
265. 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Conventions, supra note 27. art. 4.
266. See Michael L Bonnell, International Uniform Lmv in Practice: Or Where
the Real Trouble Begins, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 865 (1990) (discussing the problems of
applying uniform law to international disputes. i.e., each party involved in a dispute
will interpret the law differently and apply it selectively).
267. Interview with Harold S. Burman, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department
of State, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 2, 1993); Pinkerton, supra note 78 at 12.
268. Interview with Harold S. Burman, Office of the Legal Adviser. Department
of State, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 2, 1993). See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 136, at 172-74, 421-28 (discussing the good faith purchaser and warranties of
title established under the U.C.C.).
269. 1990 draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art. 4(3).
270. Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 11.
271. 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art 4.
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provision would, therefore, cover situations similar to the Quedlinburg
case where the heirs received the stolen articles through the thief s es-
tate.m The heirs' case turned on the argument that even though their
deceased brother never acquired legal title, they received valid title when
the art passed to them through his estate.'" Article 4 of the Conven-
tion would impute the deceased's wrongful conduct to the heirs, thereby
negating the original owper's obligation to pay compensation upon resti-
tution of the object.274
C. JURISDICTIONAL AuTHoRTY
The UNIDROIT Convention also seeks to address jurisdictional prob-
lems. ' Article 9(1) provides that a claimant may bring an action be-
fore the "courts or other competent authorities." 6 It also provides two
jurisdictional bases: one may bring an action in the state of residence of
the possessor, or in the state where the object is located at the time the
claimant files.'m The Convention specifies place of habitual residence
272. See supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text (discussing the background of
the Quedlinburg case).
273. See Chambers, supra note 10 (reporting that the heirs argued that even
though their brother's estate could not be taxed because he did not have valid title to
the treasures he stole, they could claim valid title because the statute of limitations
had expired).
274. 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art.
4(3).
275. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 286 (noting that the lack of jurisdictional
provisions in the extant international agreements governing stolen art limits the scope
of jurisdiction and leaves unanswered the question of which country can assert juris-
diction over the controversy). Existing international agreements do not contain clear
language as to jurisdiction because art theft is not recognized as an international
crime except in the context of war. Id. at 286. Since most nations are unwilling to
enforce the laws of another in the absence of an international agreement that requires
them to do so, they apply domestic laws. Id. at 306. Thus, current international
agreements implicitly express the territoriality theory of jurisdiction with each nation
applying domestic laws. Id. at 306. The result is a conflict between those common
law nations who follow the thief rule, providing greater protection to original owners,
and the civil law nations which protect bona fide purchasers. Explanatory Report, su-
pra note 26, at 192. A thief may thus launder stolen art through a civil law country.
Id. at 192.
276. 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art.
9(1).




over place of domicile because cultural objects can generally be moved
easily.'
The second jurisdictional foundation, which provides jurisdiction in
the nation where the object is located, adds flexibility by allowing
courts to settle a dispute over the object when unable to assert jurisdic-
tion over the possessor.' Article 9(2) allows the parties to submit
their disputes to another forum or to arbitration.m The drafters added
this provision to create procedural freedom and to attract a greater num-
ber of signatory states." While these provisions offer parties greater
flexibility in asserting jurisdiction, they do not eliminate the uncertainties
of choice of law conflicts.' Outside of the specific provisions called
for in the Convention, states would apply their domestic law as afforded
by the exceptions of article 11(a). This would result in the same choice
of law problems.'
D. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION
Although the UNIDROIT Convention is able to reconcile many
source/market nation differences, retroactive application of the Conven-
tion remains a great obstacle. Article 11(c) of the Convention allows
any contracting state to apply the Convention to cases of illegal exporta-
tion or theft of cultural objects which occured before the entry into
force of the Convention for that nation.' Source nations that wish to
recover cultural objects that have been taken from them over the years
favor retroactivity. Retroactive application of the Convention to al-
278. Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 36.
279. Explanatory Report, supra note 26, at 36.
280. 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art. 9.
281. Explanatory Report, supra note 26. at 36. Private international law recog-
nizes choice of forum. l
282. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text (noting that the lack of
jurisdictional provisions in international agreements impede international cooperation in
preventing illicit trade in art).
283. Supra notes 211 and accompanying text.
284. See 1990 Draft Convention and 1993 Draft Convention, supra note 27, art.
11(c) (providing that "each Contracting State shall remain free in respect of claims
brought before its courts or competent authorities to apply the Convention notwith-
standing the fact that the theft or illegal export of the cultural object occurred before
the entry into force of the Convention for that State").
285. See Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 7 (pointing out that some
countries argue that non-retroactive application would sanction illegal conduct which
occurred prior to the Convention's acceptance).
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ready-acquired artwork, however, would threaten museum collections not
only in market nations like the United States but all over the world,
leading to market nations' reluctance to sign the Convention.2"
CONCLUSION
While the UNIDROIT Convention is not perfect, the United States
should take the lead in adopting it for several reasons. The UNIDROIT
Convention would provide an equitable solution to the complex issues
involved in art theft cases. It would deter art thefts without disturbing
the art market. The Convention is also consistent with existing interna-
tional law and United States domestic law.
First, the draft UNIDROIT Convention provides equitable solutions to
art theft cases and takes significant steps toward reconciling existing
tensions between market and source nations, and between the civil and
common law countries by protecting both the rights of the original
owner and of the bona fide purchaser. Restitution of stolen property pre-
vents the original owner's property rights from being extinguished when
the thief sells the art to an innocent purchaser. Likewise, the good faith
purchaser is protected by the requirement of compensation. Second, the
Convention would deter illicit trade in stolen art without crippling the
free trade in art. Knowing that failure to investigate the provenance of
artwork may cause a purchaser to forfeit both the artwork and compen-
sation, potential buyers would more readily investigate each piece, mak-
ing it difficult for thieves to unload stolen art. Once the buyer makes
the necessary efforts to establish that the seller has legitimate title, he
will be more confident that his investment will be protected. The result
will be an unhampered market in art trade.
Third, the United States should adopt the Convention because it is
compatible with current international agreements and United States do-
mestic law. The UNIDROIT Convention greatly expands on the terms of
the UNESCO Convention by including privately owned artwork and by
creating an avenue for private litigation independent from government
action. It also provides a jurisdictional basis and standards to be used in
dispute resolutions-provisions which are absent in other international
agreements. Furthermore, the UNIDROIT Convention is consistent in
most respects with recent United States case law governing art theft
cases. Where it is not consistent with existing U.S. law, it allows for
greater recovery. Articles 3 and 4 provide the balance sought in recent
286. Burman Memorandum, supra note 29, at 7.
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court decisions by placing the burden of investigation on the purchaser.
Article 11 allows the flexibility necessary to enable courts to apply
United States law in order to achieve greater fairness.
Given the continuing problem of illicit trade in stolen cultural proper-
ty which to date has been unchecked because of the lack of internation-
al agreement, the nations of the world need to make a concerted effort
to reach a compromise. The UNIDROIT Convention embodies such a
compromise. The United States should take the lead in solving this
immense problem by supporting the ratification of the UNIDROIT Con-
vention.
